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Abstract  
Two competing views (an epistemic interpretation vs. an evidential one) are contrasted in analyzing 
the semantic and pragmatic properties of the Italian Future in its concessive use. By comparing the 
Future with another concessive marker (the modal potere ‘may’) the analysis demonstrates the 
semantic restriction of the Future to factual contexts, which proves at odds with the downgrading of 
factual commitment required by the traditional epistemic interpretation. A pragmatic analysis centred 
on the interactional properties of concessivity further supports an evidential interpretation, showing 
that, as a discourse strategy, the concessive use of the Future signals the evidential role of the 
speaker, who becomes a secondary source by acknowledging information that is intersubjectively 
shared with other participants in the interactional exchange. Other modal occurrences of the Italian 
Future fulfilling various discourse functions are also analyzed as marked interactional strategies used 
by the speaker to draw attention to states of affairs that are intersubjectively shared in the pragmatic 
context.  
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1. Epistemicity, evidentiality and conjectural assumptions 
The recent “burgeoning interest in the concept of evidentiality” (Narrog 2009:113) has caused much 
debate on the relationship between evidentiality and modality, with a special concern on “setting the 
boundaries” (de Haan 1999). Most discussion concentrated on distinguishing between evidentiality 
and epistemicity, two categories in which some degree of “fluidity” (Mithun 1986:90) has often 
been recognized. The controversies concerning the relationship with respect to evidentiality ended 
up blurring the traditional borders of epistemicity and surfaced descriptive inconsistencies such as 
those pointed out by van der Auwera and Ammann (2005:307) in describing grammatical markers 
that, albeit belonging to “evidential-prominent systems”, do have “functions closely corresponding 
to epistemic modality”, which might even suggest that some of the difficulties ultimately derive 
from a clash among different terminological traditions (Cornillie 2009). However, the ‘evidential 
vogue’ (Aikhenvald 2003a:19) also contributed to pin down those epistemic functions in which 
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epistemicity and evidentiality overlap (most prominently Palmer’s 1986, 2001 ‘epistemic 
judgements’), thus highlighting novel boundaries between evidential-epistemic functions (Kronning 
2003, Pietrandrea 2005) and pure epistemicity variously interacting in ‘modalized’ vs. ‘non-
modalized’ evidential systems (Plungian 2001, 2010). Along these lines some Romance and 
Germanic inflectional verb forms and modals were reappraised (Dendale 1994; Mortelmans 2000; 
de Haan 2001, Diewald and Smirnova 2010a) trying to disentangle epistemic and evidential 
functions.  
Assumptions, intended as the linguistic expression of speakers’ own beliefs and conjectures, 
represent a semantic area that has revealed particular complexity as far as the distinction between 
evidentiality and epistemic modality is concerned. Being connected to the speaker’s judgements, 
this kind of reasoning is traditionally considered as belonging to epistemic modality, as is for 
instance the case with the English conjectural modals may and will (‘She may be at home now / 
She’ll be at home now’). Nonetheless, as also explicitly recognized by Palmer (2003:8), 
assumptions are in fact listed among evidential categories in typological surveys derived from 
extensive research on genetically unrelated languages: 
 
Semantic parameters involved in languages with grammatical evidentials: VISUAL, 
SENSORY, INFERENCE, ASSUMPTION, REPORTED, QUOTATIVE (Aikhenvald 2004, 
2007:211) 
 
Thus, assumptions based on the speaker’s world knowledge (“we assume this on the basis of what 
we already know”) are expressed in Tariana (Aikhenvald 2003b, 2004:2-3) by a special morpheme 
paradigmatically belonging to the same grammatical system to which typical evidential notions 
such as ‘visual’, ‘sensory’, ‘reported’ also pertain. As apparent in Aikhenvald’s (2004) glosses and 
translations, what is categorized as an ‘assumption’ corresponds to speaker-internal “reasoning, 
general knowledge and, ultimately, conjecture” (Aikhenvald’s 2004:3), which calls for a more 
accurate reconsideration of the status of this kind of reasoning with respect to the boundary between 
epistemicity and evidentiality. 
If one applies these typological generalizations to Romance languages, confirmations can be 
found that conjectures are closely linked to the other evidential notions listed in Aikhenvald 
(2007:11), especially in the reportive area. The behaviour of the Portuguese Future is particularly 
indicative of the functional relationship between conjectures and reports, for this form is not only 
used as a conjectural marker, as is generally the case in Romance, but it also occurs as a reportive 
marker (Squartini 2001, 2004). Similarly, reports coexist with conjectures in the French 
Conditional, which, unlike other Romance Conditionals, not only expresses reports but is also 
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admitted in questions expressing conjectures and inferences (Squartini 2001, 2004, Rocci 2007). In 
this respect, one can also mention the behaviour of the Catalan inferential modal deure ‘must’ + 
infinitive, which, unlike its Romance cognates, can also occur in conjectural questions as in Què 
deu ser? ‘What is (lit. ‘must be’) it?’, thus neutralizing the distinction between conjectures and 
inferences (Squartini 2010). Provided that inferences not only belong to Aikhevald’s list, but are 
also recognized among evidential notions even in descriptions of languages of Europe (Dendale 
1994), the polyfunctionality of the Catalan modal ‘must’ covering both conjectures and inferences 
is another element urging for a reconsideration of the correct interpretation of conjectures between 
epistemicity and evidentiality.  
Apart from confirming that some evidential functions are regularly expressed by Romance 
verb forms, these data generally suggest that no sharp distinction can be drawn between the 
supposed ‘epistemic’ nature of conjectures and the evidential basis of reports or inferences. In this 
perspective, any semantic map of modality along the lines explored in van der Auwera and Plungian 
(1998) should be organized in a format that can accommodate these results either by recognizing a 
special area in which epistemicity and evidentiality overlap (a solution explicitly excluded by 
Boye’s 2010 discussion) or by strengthening the link between conjectural epistemicity and 
assumptive evidentiality, as also implemented by Anderson’s (1986:284) semantic map of 
evidentiality.  
Nonetheless, it must also be admitted that conjectures represent a peculiar form of indirect 
evidential knowledge in which the speaker, being the only source, has no external evidence, apart 
from world’s knowledge. Due to the lack of external evidence, which is instead the objective basis 
of proper inferential reasoning (Squartini 2008), conjectures are necessarily much more subjective 
and therefore more compatible with a reduction of the speaker’s commitment. Note that reference to 
the speaker’s commitment is traditionally a key element in most definitions of epistemicity, as for 
instance in Bybee et al. (1994:179), who state that epistemic modality “indicates the extent to which 
the speaker is committed to the truth of the proposition”. Thus, the degree of subjectivity 
intrinsically connected to conjectures naturally blurs the distinction between epistemicity and 
evidentiality, making theoretical arguments solely based on a conjectural usage inevitably complex 
and difficult to assess.  
The present study will focus on the Romance Future, which is a well described 
representative of this complex cluster of functional properties connected to conjecturality. Apart 
from the neutralization of conjectures and reports mentioned above with respect to the Portuguese 
Future, in which the interplay of epistemicity and evidentiality is particularly apparent, what 
follows aims to demonstrate that the role of evidentiality should also be more thoroughly considered 
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as far as conjectural uses of Futures in other Romance languages are concerned. For the most part, 
attention will be paid to Italian data, even though some comparative elements with other Romance 
languages will additionally be suggested throughout the text. In order to provide the reader with a 
descriptive basis, the conjectural meaning of the Italian Future will be briefly sketched out in 
section 1.1, including the pros and cons of an evidential interpretation as opposed to the traditional 
epistemic definition. This will be intended as a preparatory background to the bulk of the 
discussion, which will be mostly devoted to a special semantic extension of the Future, its 
concessive use. By leaving aside the conjectural function, in which the interaction of epistemicity 
and evidentiality is especially difficult to disentangle, it will be argued that, unlike its conjectural 
counterpart, the concessive usage provides a clearer understanding of the role of evidentiality in the 
Romance Future. Apart from retrospectively shedding light on the conjectural use, concessivity 
more aptly demonstrates the interaction of semantic properties and discourse practices. In this 
respect, it will be shown that a generalized evidential interpretation not only explains the semantic 
restrictions of the Future as a concessive marker but also its interactional properties, in which the 
speaker’s ‘conceding move’ can be ‘evidentially’ interpreted as confirmation of information 
provided by an external source. Other modal occurrences of the Italian Future fulfilling various 
discourse functions will also be analyzed as marked interactional strategies used by the speaker to 
draw attention to states of affairs that are intersubjectively shared in the pragmatic context. 
1.1. Conjectural Futures 
The Italian version of the well known example of the postman represents the typical modal usage in 
which the inflectional Future expresses a conjectural meaning: 
(1) [Suonano alla porta] Sarà il postino 
 ‘[The bell rings] It will be [be:FUT1] the postman’ 
Due to the intrinsic complexity of conjectures discussed above, this usage has been variedly 
interpreted, especially among those interested in reshaping the mutual relationship between 
epistemicity and evidentiality. Whereas Dendale (2001), Dendale and van Bogaert (2007:79-83) 
and Pietrandrea (2005) consider the Italian Future in (1) as well as its corresponding form in French 
as consistently and solely epistemic, Radanova-Kuševa (1991-1992), Rocci (2000:249), Squartini 
(2001) and Giacalone and Topadze (2007:25-29) subscribe to an evidential interpretation.  
These discrepancies are basically due to the interpretation of the notion of evidential source: 
those who plead for an evidential interpretation consider the feature [SELF] (Frawley 1992:413) as a 
                                               
1 Abbreviations used: COND = Conditional, FUT = Future, PF = Perfect, SUBJ = Subjunctive. 
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possible source (by using the Future the speaker indicates herself / himself as the source of the 
utterance). In this perspective greater attention is paid to the paradigmatic opposition that in Italian 
can be observed between the Future (3) and the Conditional (2), where the latter is used as a 
reportive marker while the Future underlines the speaker’s own assumptions (see Radanova-Kuševa 
1991-1992:346-347): 
(2)  Secondo Marco, Andrea sarebbe già arrivato 
 ‘According to M., A. has already arrived [arrive:COND.PF]’ 
(3) Secondo me, Andrea sarà già arrivato 
 ‘In my opinion, A. has already arrived [arrive:FUT.PF]’ 
This functional distinction can be straightforwardly interpreted as an evidential opposition between 
an external source marked by the Conditional and an internal source in which the speaker’s own 
reasoning provides evidence for the information contained in the utterance. 
As opponents to an evidential interpretation of the Future, those who prefer to stick to the 
traditional epistemic view of the Romance Future insist rather on the contrast between the Future 
and non-modal forms (forms unmarked for modality). Thus, in opposing a Future Perfect which has 
a conjectural meaning (5) to a modally unmarked Present Perfect (4) it can be observed that the 
former seems to convey a reduced degree of certainty: 
(4)  Andrea è già arrivato 
 ‘A. has already arrived [arrive:PF]’ 
(5) Andrea sarà già arrivato 
 ‘A. has already arrived [arrive:FUT.PF]’ 
Nonetheless, the alleged downgrading of the epistemic commitment cannot be easily conciliated 
with the empirical observation that the Future also collocates with an adverb expressing strong 
commitment such as sicuramente ‘certainly, definitely’, which shows that, when using a Future, a 
speaker may also convey ‘subjectively’ strong commitment (Bertinetto 1991:118-119, Squartini 
2008:926). In what follows these arguments will not be pursued further, leaving aside conjectural 
uses and concentrating the discussion on the concessive usage of the Italian Future. In a sense, 
focussing attention to this secondary function is intended as a strategy to break the deadlock created 
by the confrontation between the evidential as opposed to the epistemic interpretation of conjectural 
forms.  
 
1.2. Concessive Futures 
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In dealing with verb forms that convey a concessive meaning Bybee et al. (1994:227) mention the 
Romance Future, which is represented in their sample by the following Spanish example (originally 
from Gili Gaya 19513:144): 
(6) – Fulano es un sabio 
 – Lo será; sin embargo, se ha equivocado algunas veces 
  ‘Fulano is a wise man 
 ‘He may be [be:FUT]; nevertheless, he has been mistaken at times’ 
Similarly to Spanish, the Italian Future has a concessive meaning (Bertinetto 1991:116, Berretta 
1997), as is shown by the Italian translation of the Spanish example in (6): 
(7) – Fulano è saggio 
 – Lo sará; tuttavia, qualche volta si è sbagliato 
  ‘Fulano is a wise man 
 ‘He may be [be:FUT]; nevertheless, he has been mistaken at times’ 
The extension from conjecturality to concessivity, which is demonstrated by the Italian as well as 
by the Spanish Future, cannot be generalized as a common Romance feature, a significant exception 
being the French Future, which can occur in a conjectural context such as (1) but has no concessive 
use (Rocci 2000). This distribution, in which the occurrence of the concessive meaning implies the 
conjectural use (Italian and Spanish have both) while the opposite implication does not hold (French 
Futures can be conjectural but not concessive), can be considered as supportive evidence for the 
diachronically derived nature of the concessive uses, as tacitly assumed in most analyses and 
explicitly recognized by Bybee et al. (1994:226-227), who propose a general semantic path leading 
from conjectural to concessive markers.  
In the spirit of the present article, this diachronic evolution calls for a semantic explanation 
that should justify how a conjectural marker can eventually move into concessivity, which 
interestingly forces us to reappraise the semantic interpretation of conjecturality. As discussed 
above, the conjectural meaning expressed by the Romance Future has been inconsistently 
interpreted as epistemic as well as evidential. In this respect, the evolution towards concessivity can 
be seized as an opportunity to contrastively evaluate these two interpretations contributing to a 
comprehensive understanding of the semantic and pragmatic properties involved in the modal uses 
of Futures. 
2. Semantic properties of concessivity 
Semantically, concessivity is particularly interesting as far as the interplay between factuality and 
non-factuality is concerned. In this respect, it must be emphasized that concessivity is in itself 
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independent from factuality, non-factual concessives also being admitted, as is clearly the case of 
English concessive conditionals (even if). However, in describing non-conditional concessive 
relations (‘although p, q’), König (1988:146-147) acknowledges a basic semantic requirement: “the 
two clauses that enter into a concessive relation have a factual character”, which means that they 
refer to what the speaker considers as an actual state of affairs (a ‘fact’ in the actual world). Futures 
occurring in a concessive premise p are also supposed to fulfil this requirement: in (6-7) the speaker 
commits himself / herself to the truth of p (‘F. is a wise man’) as well as to the truth of q (‘he has 
been mistaken at times’). By means of the concessive construction the speaker emphasizes that 
between p and q, albeit both true, there is ‘incompatibility’ (König 1988:146) based on a 
generalized ‘topos’ (Verhagen 2000:366). In a situation such as (6-7) the topos can be formulated as 
follows: ‘If you are wise, you usually don’t make mistakes’. Apart from the topos, which, being 
based on a common assumption, can in itself be interpreted as a form of epistemic reasoning 
(Verhagen 2005), the required factuality of p patently runs counter to the traditional interpretation 
of the Future as an epistemic form downgrading the degree of certainty.  
Actually, Bybee et al. (1994:227), not unlike Sweetser (1990:70), were aware of the 
incompatibility between the factual nature of concessive premises and the concessive usage of 
forms traditionally defined as non-factual, similar concerns also being expressed by König 
(1988:154) with respect to Subjunctives, whose occurrence in a concessive clause “is totally 
unmotivated for this ‘factual’ construction”. As to Subjunctives, Bybee et al. (1994:226) correctly 
observe that their occurrence in concessive clauses demonstrates that the traditional view, in which 
Subjunctives are treated as non-factual, should be revised, otherwise one cannot justify why 
Subjunctives occur in the factual environment required by concessive clauses.  
With respect to Romance Subjunctives the occurrence in concessive clauses can be 
independently justified considering that a factual interpretation also emerges in ‘thematic’ 
Subjunctives, i.e. those occurring in topicalized clauses that refer to information which is most 
typically already given in the textual background and therefore assumed as factual (Giorgi and 
Pianesi 1997:226-228).2 A similar explanation is suggested by König (1988:158) with respect to the 
recurrent typological finding that conditional connectives are among the most frequent sources of 
concessive markers (cf. Latin et-si ‘and/also if’, Italian anche se ‘even if/even though’), which 
                                               
2 An Italian Subjunctive, not regularly admitted in a complement clause depending on the matrix verb sapere ‘know’ (i), is 
acceptable if the complement clause, being left dislocated (ii), becomes a topicalized and therefore thematic element: 
 
(i) *So che sia partito 
‘I know that (he) has left [has:SUBJ left] 
(ii) Che sia partito, lo so  
‘That (he) has left [has:SUBJ left], I know’  
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seems to suggest connections to the non-factual character of conditional clauses. Again, this would 
be inconsistent with the factuality of a concessive premise. König (1988:158) solves this 
inconsistency by suggesting that non-factuality is not an intrinsic property of conditional 
constructions in general, for the propositional content of ‘thematic’ conditionals (8) can be 
contextually given (‘given conditionals’ in Sweetser 1990) and therefore inferred as factual:  
(8) (A) I was in France for a year 
  (B) If you were in France for a year, your French must be excellent 
A common heuristic element shared by König (1988:158) and Bybee et al. (1994) in discussing 
concessive Subjunctives and conditionals is that concessivity is intended as an opportunity to revise 
traditional and over-simplistic grammatical descriptions concerning the relationship between a 
given form (Subjunctives, conditional clauses) and non-factuality.  
Trying to extend this argument to the concessive uses of Futures would imply that, parallel 
to a thematic or factual conditional clause, a ‘factual’ conjectural use of the Future should also be 
admitted, which is obviously inconsistent with any properly ‘epistemic’ definition. This should 
have led Bybee et al. (1994) to revise the traditional definition of the Romance Future. Bafflingly 
and inconsistently with their own analysis of Subjunctives, Bybee et al. (1994:227) do not extend 
this line of reasoning to concessivity. Rather, they elaborate an alternative explanation based on the 
assumption that the semantic evolution from conjecturality to concessivity can be explained as a 
case of scope-broadening, similarly to other grammaticalization processes (Tabor and Traugott 
1998). Thus, in concessive statements the original epistemic meaning of the Future as a conjectural 
marker, broadening its scope, “applies to the connection between the two propositions, rather than 
to the proposition which contains the epistemic marker” (Bybee et al. 1994:227). Actually, a 
problematic point in this explanation is that scope may broaden, but this should not involve a 
complete reversal of the original semantic properties. If an epistemic form is described as involving 
a reduced degree of commitment to the truth of the proposition, how can it become factual in 
concessive contexts? Scope-broadening only implies an extension of the semantic properties 
beyond the original syntactic level, which can be joined by a semantic generalization. Nonetheless, 
the original semantic properties should not be reversed or cancelled, this being a potential 
counterexample with respect to the process of semantic generalization.  
Nonetheless, it might also be observed that, from a strictly logical perspective, concessivity 
is in fact characterized by intrinsic contradiction (Verhagen 2000:365-366), which ultimately 
derives from the contrast between the entailed factuality of both p and q and the unexpected non-
actualization of the generally accepted topos. This inconsistency, which in a sense is the semantic 
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essence of concessivity, has been cognitively solved by postulating multiple mental spaces, thus 
admitting the possibility that the topos, albeit generally valid, is not actualized in the given situation 
(Verhagen 2000:365-368). From a linguistic perspective, the coexistence of different 
representational levels seems to be mirrored by the structural complexity and markedness of 
specialized concessive constructions across languages, which, apart from being non-ubiquitous, 
tend to develop relatively late in the history of those language where they occur (König 1988:151).  
The variety of sources listed by König (1988) in his typological survey of concessive 
connectives also confirms the structural complexity of concessivity. On the one hand, given the 
semantic requirement on the factuality of both propositions, it is not surprising that among these 
connectives one finds elements “emphatically asserting the truth of one of a pair of clause” (König 
1988:154-155) such as ‘true, fact, well, indeed’ (cf. English true p but … as in True he is old, but 
not helpless; German zwar p aber …, in which zwar derives from es ist wahr ‘it is true’). But, as 
already mentioned above, one should not forget that, apart from factual concessives, also concessive 
conditionals (Even if I try very hard, I won’t manage) exist, in which the requirement on factuality, 
if any, is restricted to the apodosis q and does not necessarily involve the protasis p (König 
1986:231-234, König 1988:158, Haspelmath and König 1998). The sheer empirical finding that one 
and the same connective occurs as concessive as well as concessive conditional (Haspelmath and 
König 1998:589-592), as is the case of the Italian connective anche se, which not only means ‘even 
though’ but also ‘even if’,3 suggests that the boundary between factuality and non-factuality is not 
strictly delimited and can be variously arranged across languages. In this respect, one might venture 
to suggest that the occurrence of Futures in concessive contexts should be regarded as another 
instance of the lack of formal distinctions between factuality and non-factuality, which would 
parallel the behaviour of concessive connectives such as Italian anche se ‘even though / even if’). 
But, if this is the case, one would expect Futures to be compatible with non-factual concessive 
conditionals and not only with factual ones. This hypothesis will be tested in section 2.1, where a 
comparison will be proposed between the concessive use of the Future analyzed so far and the 
Italian modal potere ‘may’ + infinitive.     
2.1 Non-factuality, genericity and concessivity 
Like the English modal may (9-10), the Italian modal potere can occur both as a conjectural and a 
concessive marker, as is shown by the Italian translations (11-12) of the English examples in (9-10): 
(9)  He may be at home now 
                                               
3 The two readings of Italian anche se ‘even though / even if’ are only partially regulated by the morphosyntactic alternation 
Indicative vs. Subjunctive, see Mazzoleni (1991:787-789). 
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(10) She may jog, but she sure looks unhealthy to me (Traugott and Dasher 2002:115) 
(11) Può essere a casa adesso 
(12) Può anche fare jogging, ma a me non sembra una persona in salute 
A comparable distribution can be found with the Italian inflectional Future, which, as already 
demonstrated above, can be both conjectural (13) and concessive (14), and is another viable 
translation of the English modal may in (9) and (10), respectively: 
(13) Adesso sarà a casa 
(14) Farà anche jogging, ma a me non sembra una persona in salute  
These data seem to suggest that the modal potere and the inflectional Future are virtually 
synonymous as far as their modal meanings are concerned, but a differential behaviour emerges by 
forcing a non-factual interpretation. In (15) a non-factual reading is triggered by the concomitant 
effect of a free-choice quantifier (quanto gli pare ‘whatever he likes, as he likes’) and a generic 
subject (uno ‘one’): 
(15)  Uno può essere alto quanto gli pare, ma lassù non ci arriva 
 ‘One may be as tall as one likes, but one can’t reach up that high’ 
Free-choice quantifiers (König 1986, 1988, Haspelmath and König 1998) open up a series of 
possible worlds none of which can satisfy the concessive relation between the premise p (‘No 
matter how tall one is’) and the consequence q (‘One can’t reach there’). Since these worlds are all 
equally possible, they cannot be all true at the same time, only one of them corresponding to the 
actual world. However, the generic context in (15) excludes any reference to the actual world, 
making this context intrinsically non-factual. 
The interesting contrastive point is that the Future cannot substitute for the modal potere in 
similar generic contexts:  
(16)  ??Uno sarà alto quanto gli pare, ma lassù non ci arriva 
 ‘One is [be:FUT] as tall as one likes, but can’t reach there’ 
Significantly, the Future becomes grammatical if an appropriate deictic anchoring (Mazzoleni 
1991:788) transforms a generic interpretation into a specific one: 
(17)  Sarà alto quanto gli pare, ma lassù non ci arriva 
 ‘He may be [be:FUT] as tall as he likes, but he can’t reach there’ 
In (17) specificity is triggered by substituting the generic subject ‘one’ with a non-generic 3rd 
person null subject, which shows that in (16) it is the generic subject ‘one’ that crucially permits the 
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non-factual interpretation, thus making the Future ungrammatical. The free-choice quantifier per se 
is instead compatible with the Future, as confirmed by (17). In order to interpret these data it should 
be borne in mind that concessive clauses containing free-choice quantifiers, even though classified 
by König (1986, 1988) as a subtype of concessive conditionals, cannot be totally equated to those 
introduced by the English connective even if.4 While the latter are indisputably non-factual, the 
indefinite set of possible worlds referred to by free-choice quantifiers also contains the actual world, 
thus admitting a factual interpretation. However, a factual interpretation can be excluded if the free-
choice quantifier is combined with a generic subject, as in (15-16). 
If one considers the whole set of data just presented, it can be concluded that the Future can 
only occur in those contexts which admit a factual interpretation, while potere + infinitive is also 
admitted in non-factual contexts referring to a generic set of unspecified possible worlds. This 
behaviour shows that, even though concessivity may extend beyond factuality, Italian Futures do 
show restrictions to factual situations. Obviously, this is not what one would expect under the 
assumption that concessivity derives from an epistemic Future, whose definition is traditionally 
based on a reduced commitment with respect to factuality.  
The comparison between potere and the Future is particularly illuminating, for it 
demonstrates that bona fide epistemic markers such as potere + infinitive are compatible with non-
factual concessive contexts. This means that the solution proposed by Bybee et al. (1994), based on 
scope-broadening of the original epistemic meaning, may fit well in explaining the distribution of 
the modal potere, and possibly of its English counterpart may, but cannot be extended as such to the 
Italian Future, due to different restrictions of these forms with respect to non-factual contexts.   
In this perspective, the two Italian concessive forms might be representative of different 
semantic evolutionary paths, both eventually leading to concessivity, but following different routes. 
The modal potere can be lexically contrasted to the modal dovere ‘must’, whereby the former 
shows a reduced degree of certainty, similarly to the distinction between English may and must (van 
der Auwera and Plungian 1998:85-86). Thus, potere involves an epistemic dimension in a proper 
sense, which explains why, once it is used as a concessive marker, it can also occur in non-factual 
contexts (15). Note that acknowledging the non-factuality of potere in (15) is not tantamount to 
considering it as an epistemic marker expressing conjectural reasoning. As extensively argued in 
Sweetser (1990:69-73), once modals are used as concessive markers, they are “conversationally 
reinterpreted” as speech-act modals, thus losing their original root and epistemic meanings. 
                                               
4 Note that concessives containing free-choice quantifiers have also been treated separately from proper concessive conditionals (i.e. 
the even if-type) defining them ‘unconditionals’ (Mazzoleni 1990:49-50).   
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However, what potere retains of its epistemic origin is a closer connection to non-factuality, which 
makes it compatible with the generic context in (15). In this respect, potere actually represents a 
semantic evolution from root possibility and epistemicity to concessivity, as suggested by Bybee et 
al. (1994). On the contrary, the Future has no paradigmatically modal form with respect to which it 
involves a lower degree of commitment. As shown above, the Future (5) can be epistemically 
contrasted to non-modal forms such as the Present or the Present Perfect (4), while, among modal 
forms, the Future (3) can be opposed to the Conditional (2) in an evidential contrast in which the 
Future identifies the speaker’s reasoning as the source of information, whereas the Conditional 
marks reports. Thus, in the modal system the Future turns out to be marked with respect to the 
source of the information, without necessarily implying an epistemic reduction of factuality. As 
already mentioned above, this is confirmed by the empirical observation that the Future collocates 
with adverbs of strong commitment (sicuramente ‘certainly, definitely’) and not only with weak 
epistemic adverbs such as forse ‘perhaps’ (Squartini 2008:926). The interesting point now is that 
the evidential nature of the Future, independently shown by paradigmatic oppositions with respect 
to the Conditional and syntagmatic collocations with modal adverbs, is also mirrored in its 
evolution towards concessivity, which does not include non-factual contexts. Cases such as (15) are 
too tightly rooted into the downgrading of the speaker’s commitment connected to epistemicity and 
are therefore only compatible with a proper ‘epistemic conjectural’ marker (potere + infinitive) but 
not with an ‘evidential conjectural’ marker (Future). In a more general perspective, the contrast 
between these modal forms recapitulates the results of typological research on the 
grammaticalization of concessive connectives (König 1988), in which, as shown in section 2, 
concessivity is fostered by a varied array of sources, including factual (True he is old) as well as 
non-factual markers (‘even if’). 
All in all, the analysis conducted so far has demonstrated that the Future is too factual to be 
defined as a proper epistemic form, which makes the alternative, i.e. evidential, interpretation more 
reasonable. Consistently with this conclusion, it can be maintained that not only will the evidential 
interpretation be preferred as far as the concessive use of the Future is concerned, but it should also 
be extended to its conjectural use, whose disputable status between epistemicity and evidentiality 
has been the starting point of the present discussion. 
Now, the issue that still remains open is to establish what kind of evidentiality is expressed 
by the Future as a concessive marker. In the next section it will be shown that a major contribution 
in elucidating this point is provided by an integration of the semantic analysis followed so far with a 
different look on concessivity based on its functions in discourse interaction. 
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3. Concessivity in interaction 
A classical “concern of rhetoricians” (Couper-Kuhlen and Thompson 2000:383), conceding has 
been extensively studied as a major discourse phenomenon in recent pragmatic analyses that have 
particularly emphasized its function as an interactional strategy basically intended to mitigate 
contrast in conversation. As noted by König and Siemund (2000:356), discrepancy between 
semantic and interactional perspectives can be found in the role of the inferential topos on the basis 
of which a contrast between p and q is posited (Verhagen 2000). Being a typically covert 
background assumption, this ‘generalized inference’ is not explicitly recognized in interactional 
analyses of concessivity, in which the following three overt conversational moves are distinguished 
(Couper-Kuhlen and Thompson 2000:382): 
 
1st move A: States something or makes some point 
2nd move B: Acknowledges the validity of this statement or point (the conceding move) 
3rd move B: Goes on to claim the validity of a potentially contrasting statement or point 
 
Considering that the generalized topos proposed in semantic analyses is licensed by an inferential 
process often referred to as ‘epistemic’ (Verhagen 2000, 2005), avoiding reference to the 
generalized topos has indirectly contributed to defocusing the role of epistemicity. On the contrary, 
what is focussed on in an interactional perspective is the ‘polyphonic’ dimension of concessivity, 
which more directly impinges on evidentiality rather than epistemicity (Kronning 2003). As is 
apparent in Couper-Kuhlen and Thompson (2000:382), interactional concessivity is fundamentally 
intended as involving more than one participant (usually a dyadic structure), in which participant B, 
acknowledging a statement made by participant A, “reports” it, this being considered the core of 
concessivity (“the conceding move”).  
This reportive interpretation has been pointed out as particularly salient in concessive 
modals, which in fact were the first concessive elements thoroughly analyzed in an interactional 
dimension. Since Sweetser’s (1990:70-71) original observations, the English concessive modal may 
has been repeatedly discussed as evidence for an intersubjective interpretation of modality (Traugott 
and Dasher 2002:115). The interesting point here is that intersubjectivity has also been referred to 
as a significant dimension of evidentiality (Nuyts 2001a:34-35, 2001b, 2006: 13-15 and Cornillie 
2007a,b). It should be admitted, though, that Nuyts’ intersubjectivity squarely differs from 
Traugott’s. This point is explicitly emphasized by Traugott (2010:34), when she observes that in her 
view intersubjectivity is a dynamic process evolving from a subjective basis and gradually 
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involving “coding of greater attention to addressee”, while in Nuyts (2001a:34-35, 2001b, 2006: 13-
15) and Cornillie (2007a,b) intersubjectivity is not intrinsically connected to subjectivity and may 
even cover objectivity (what is objective is also intersubjectively shared). Nonetheless, concessivity 
would be considered intersubjective in both accounts. In Traugott’s interpretation concessive 
markers evolve out of subjective modals (e.g. English may) enhancing the speaker’s attention 
towards the addressee and are therefore intersubjective, but they might also be instances of shared 
knowledge between participants in an interactional exchange, which is the way in which Nuyts 
connects intersubjectivity to evidentiality. This connection also clearly appears in Traugott and 
Dasher’s (2002:115) gloss to their example of may as a concessive marker (“although she may jog, 
as you say …”). This example was already discussed in section 2.1 above and is repeated here for 
clarity’s sake:  
(10) She may jog, but she sure looks unhealthy to me (Traugott and Dasher 2002:115) 
When they interpret intersubjectivity as a reference to what “the interlocutor or someone has said”, 
Traugott and Dasher (2002:115) actually pave the way to evidentiality. This is most clearly so, if 
one considers that quoting, even though notionally distinct from reportive evidentiality, belongs to 
the same pragmatic “meeting ground” in which evidentiality shares a major role (Güldemann and 
von Roncador 2002). 
As to the Italian Future, an evidential interpretation of concessivity was already proposed by 
Berretta (1997) and a comparable analysis was also suggested by Bolón Pedretti (1999:837). 
However, contrary to the general definition of concessivity provided above on the basis of Couper-
Kuhlen and Thompson (2000:382), a concessive usage of the Future is not always based on a quote, 
since it is also admitted when both the speaker and the interlocutor directly perceive the relevant 
state of affairs. In (17) above, it is not necessarily the case that speaker A has just said that someone 
is tall, this most probably being a state of affairs perceivable to both participants.  
Trying to interpret these observations in an evidential perspective, it can be observed that 
direct perceptions as well as reports can be considered as evidential sources (see Aikhenvald’s 
2004, 2007:211 list of evidential functions in section 1 above), which provides a unifying semantic 
umbrella for these phenomena. Nonetheless, an obvious problematic point immediately arises from 
this analysis: how is it possible that two cognitively opposite dimensions of evidentiality, i.e direct 
perception and indirect knowledge via reports, can be expressed by one and the same form? I think 
that an answer to this question comes again from the intersubjective interpretation repeatedly 
suggested in interactional analyses of concessivity. Direct perceptions and reports can be interpreted 
as two different sensory dimensions of intersubjectivity. What is openly perceivable to 
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conversational participants, either because heard (report) or seen (direct perception), can be 
considered as equally intersubjective, being based on a common ground shared by all participants. 
Intersubjectivity can be conceived as an evidential relationship between the speaker’s 
subjective SELF and external inputs, whereby the speaker acknowledges what external inputs 
provide. Due to this interactional interplay, concessivity represents a very complex cognitive 
procedure in which SELF and OTHER, the two basic dimensions of evidentiality (Frawley 1992), are 
concomitantly at work: a subjective SELF acknowledges what comes from external sources that are 
intersubjectively shared by other participants. As seen above, this interactional interplay can be 
considered intersubjective in Traugott and Dasher’s (2002) perspective, for it involves a dynamic 
extension from the speaker’s subjectivity to the addressee’s sphere, but is also intersubjective in 
Nuyts’ (2001a:34-35, 2001b) sense for it is based on the interlocutors’ shared and possibly also 
objectively perceived knowledge.   
Intersubjective acknowledging is what distinguishes concessive from conjectural uses of the 
Future, for the latter only expresses cognitive products of the speaker’s SELF. By accepting or 
acknowledging what is provided by external sources (either sensory data or report) the speaker 
subscribes to these sources, thus sharing some form of responsibility with respect to the 
informational content of the proposition. In evidential terms this co-responsibility can be 
represented by treating the speaker as a secondary source of the information. This implies that the 
evolution from conjecturality to concessivity can be depicted as a change in the status of the 
speaker, who switches from the role of primary to secondary source. In an evidential perspective, 
the cognitive (Verhagen 2000:365-366) as well as morphosyntactic (König 1988:151) markedness 
of concessivity mentioned in section 2 can be interpreted as being due to the interplay of two 
different evidential sources, in which the speaker, albeit ‘grudgingly’ (Sweetser 1990:71), accepts 
the role of secondary source by acknowledging what external primary sources provide. From an 
interactional perspective the intersubjective dimension of concessivity might be interpreted as 
representative of what Cornillie (2010) calls ‘pre-emptive’ use, in which modality permits the 
speaker to signal that potential (counter)-arguments of the interlocutor have been taken into 
account. Following this line of reasoning, in the next section it will be shown that the same marker 
(the Future) can fulfil rather different interactional functions, while maintaining the same 
intersubjectively shared evidential sources.   
4. Beyond concessivity: other interactional Futures  
Having shown how the concessive use of the Future can be interpreted in an evidential perspective 
and to what extent this can be capitalized on in order to revise traditional epistemic definitions, 
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attention will now turn to other ‘modal’ uses of the Italian Future that share an interactional 
dimension with the concessive use seen above. The most relevant point that will be made with 
respect to these further instances of interactional Futures is that they can also be interpreted as 
evidential, consistently with the description of conjectural and concessive uses provided above. 
 Bazzanella (1994, 2000) and Bazzanella and Bosco (2000) have already underlined the 
discursively marked role of Italian Futures, even though they don’t explicitly mention the colloquial 
usage in (18), in which the speaker retorts to an insult by ‘quoting’ an insolent utterance originally 
produced by another participant in the same conversational exchange:  
(18) Scemo sarai TU!         
 ‘YOU are [be:FUT] stupid! 
The marked illocutionary force of (18) is signalled by its ‘exclamative’ intonation (see also Bolón 
Pedretti, 1999 on Spanish ‘exclamative’ Futures), whose prosodic focus can be found in the 
postverbal pronominal subject tu ‘you’. The inflectional form of the Future is an additional 
morphosyntactic element contributing to the marked illocutionary force of this utterance. From an 
interactional point of view (18) can be considered as an expression of dialogic contrast, which 
ultimately is interactionally connected to concessivity (concessions dialogically prelude to a 
potential contrast, see Couper-Kuhlen and Thompson 2000:382). Nonetheless, the discursive 
element that (18) really shares with the concessive uses described in section 3 is the intersubjective 
dimension based on the reportive nature of this usage: by retortively repeating an insulting utterance 
the speaker is also ‘reporting’ what another participant has said. The quoted part of the utterance 
(scemo ‘stupid’) is a given element as far as discursive informational flow is concerned and is 
therefore syntactically located at the left periphery of the sentence, where thematic elements are 
typically placed. The part of the utterance that is discursively new (the pronoun tu ‘you’) is 
prosodically and syntactically marked as a focus at the end of the sentence.  
Providing a connection between the Future in (18) and the concessive examples seen above 
this reportive interpretation confirms that the common feature among these Futures is represented 
by an evidential source intersubjectively shared by discourse participants. By making concessions 
or expressing contrast with respect to what the addressee has just said the speaker refers to the 
addressee as an external source to which the speaker dialogically reacts. 
 Elaborating on intersubjectivity one can also interpret other intonationally marked utterances 
(19-20), where, unlike (18), it is the Future to be prosodically underlined with a higher pitch: 
(19) [Ho dimenticato le chiavi] SARÒ scemo!       
 ‘[I forgot my keys] I am [be:FUT] stupid’ 
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(20) SARÀ carina questa bambina!        
 ‘Isn’t [be:FUT] she nice, this baby?’ 
Consistently with prosodic differences, the interactional interpretation of (19-20) is radically 
different from (18). Instead of contrast, the Futures in (19-20) are dialogically used to attract other 
participants’ attention to some given state of affairs, this being also interpretable as a request for 
confirmation, as shown by the English translation in (20). The situation to which attention is drawn 
is directly perceivable by all participants (20) or inferable from external sources, as in (19), where a 
circumstantial piece of data (‘I don’t have my keys’) triggers a generalized inference (‘if you forget 
your keys, you must be stupid’). As shown above in Aikhenvald’s list (section 1), sensory evidence 
and inferences are both evidential notions, whose common applicability in (19-20) confirms the role 
of evidentiality in explaining the occurrence of a Future in these ‘exclamative’ contexts. The 
unifying element in different interactional contexts (concession, contrast, request for confirmation 
and, possibly, other functions) is represented by reference to an external piece of evidence that is 
intersubjectively shared, either through direct perception, report or inferences. 
 More generally, it can be concluded that evidentiality, due to its intersubjective basis, can 
provide a comprehensive umbrella encompassing the functional behaviour of the Italian Future, 
which obviously lends additional credit to the hypothesis that the conjectural use should be more 
consistently considered as evidential rather than epistemic. The non-epistemic nature of the Future 
is particularly apparent in the ‘exclamative’ contexts discussed in this section. Analyzing these uses 
as connected to the epistemic meaning of the Future (a lower degree of certainty) would produce 
contradictory results: How could we explain the direct perception of a state of affairs (20) as a case 
of lower degree of certainty? In (20) the speaker is not at all undermining the degree of certainty, 
being rather interested in intersubjectively sharing his / her perception with other participants, 
which is an evidentially-based interactional practice.  
These data might also indicate some interesting hints for an interlinguistic comparison. As 
mentioned above, Spanish admits pragmatic extensions of the Future comparable to those discussed 
above (Bolón Pedretti 1999). Apart from concessive contexts (see section 2 above), the 
inferentially-based context in (19) admits a Future in Spanish as well: 
(21) ¡Seré boba, me olvidé las llaves! (Bolón Pedretti 1999:837)    
 ‘I am [be:FUT] stupid, I forgot my keys’ 
Unlike Italian and Spanish, these pragmatically extended uses of the Future are not documented in 
French, which might be tentatively connected to the observation that French also differs from 
Italian and Spanish in having no concessive usage of the Future. This seems to confirm that the 
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concessive extension can be considered as systematically connected to the other pragmatically 
marked uses presented in this section, which explains why they consistently develop and vary 
across Romance languages.  
 Nonetheless, French Futures have developed other ‘exclamative’ extensions (Futur 
d’indignation, Martin 1981, Soutet 2007) that are not admitted in Italian:  
(22) On aura tout vu! (Novakova 2000:131-132)     
 ‘We have seen [have:FUT seen] everything!’ 
Apparently, the Future in (22) is not only used to intersubjectively share information by drawing 
other participants’ attention to external data. More prominently, it expresses the subjective surprise 
of the speaker with respect to a given state of affairs, which is not the case in the Italian examples 
discussed in this section. Surprise or speaker’s ‘unprepared mind’ are connected to another 
grammatical category, mirativity, whose relationship to evidentiality has also been intensively 
debated (DeLancey 1997, 2001, Lazard 1999). A comparison with French exceeds the limits of this 
work, but on the basis of these preliminary data it can be imagined that an interlinguistic 
comparison among Romance languages should also take into account the role of mirativity in 
determining the semantic and pragmatic behavior of modal forms, thus introducing an additional 
tricky boundary. 
5. Conclusion  
The analysis presented above has demonstrated the extent to which the semantic treatment of a 
grammatical category can be fruitfully integrated by a discursive interpretation of its interactional 
functions. Concessivity has proven as a particularly stimulating empirical domain as far as the 
interplay between semantic and pragmatic dimensions is concerned. In this respect, the first part of 
the analysis has demonstrated that a semantic requirement (factuality of concessive premises) 
makes it extremely difficult to maintain the traditional epistemic interpretation of the Future. The 
comparison between two different concessive verb markers (the inflectional Future and potere + 
infinitive) has shown that the evolution from conjecturality to concessivity may be more varied than 
generally assumed, demonstrating that the modal potere represents the evolution of an epistemic 
conjectural marker, which, even when used as a concessive form, maintains its compatibility with 
non-factual contexts. On the other hand the concessive use is representative of a different evolution 
that proves itself more consistent with an original evidential interpretation of its diachronic source 
(the conjectural use of the Future).  
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The pragmatic analysis has shown that not only is evidentiality more compatible with the 
semantic properties of the concessive use, but also more consistently goes together with the 
pragmatic properties of concessivity as an interactional phenomenon in discourse. The interplay 
between the speaker’s own conjectural reasoning and the acknowledgment of external evidence is 
the evidential basis of concessivity, which combines the subjective nature of the conjectural use 
with an intersubjective dimension, transforming the speaker from a primary source of conjectural 
reasoning into a secondary source. Other illocutionarily marked occurrences of the Italian Future 
have supported a general evidential analysis based on the intersubjective sharing of external 
evidence. As suggested by a tentative comparison to French, future research should now 
concentrate on the role of mirativity in explaining some additional pragmatically marked 
occurrences of the Romance Future.  
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